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Deciding on Behalf of Others Does Not
Mitigate Selfishness
An Experiment
We test whether deciding on behalf of a passive third party makes participants
less selfish in a subsequent decision on behalf of themselves. We find that, in a
standard dictator game and in a modified dictator game that allows for ”moral
wiggle room”, the experience of having decided for others does not mitigate
selfishness.
JEL: C91, D02, D30, D63, D64
Keywords: dictator game; decision making on behalf of others; order effect.
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1. Research Question
In recent years, experimental economists have become very interested in decision making
on behalf of others (see e.g. Branas-Garza et al., 2009). Such decisions have for instance
been shown to be less prone to loss aversion (Füllbrunn and Luhan, 2017) and to risk
aversion (Polman). In this paper, we investigate whether the experience of deciding on
behalf of others mitigates selfishness, and thereby works as a nudge. Specifically in our
experiment we test whether having decided on behalf of a passive third party makes
participants more likely to choose the fair allocation in a subsequent dictator game where
they play in the role of active dictators, and their own money is at stake. In our design, a
participant thus decides twice. In the baseline she first decides on behalf of herself, then
on behalf of a third party. In the treatment, we swap the order.
In the standard design of the dictator game, participants on average share a substantial
fraction of their endowment with a passive recipient (Engel, 2011). They share consider-
ably less though if the design provides ”moral wiggle room” (Dana et al., 2007). Building
on their design, we test whether the experience of having decided on behalf of a third
party has the power to tame moral wiggle room.
Results are sobering. When deciding on behalf of another participant (a passive dicta-
tor), participants make very equitable choices, also in the presence of moral wiggle room.
Yet this experience does not spill over to subsequently making the same decision on behalf
of themselves. The nudge does not work.
2. Design
We implement the 2x2 design of Table 1. In one dimension, moral wiggle room is absent
or present. In the other dimension we manipulate the order of two subsequent decisions:
one decision as “ruler”, the other as “dictator”. When the (active) participant decides as
a ”ruler”, she must allocate money between a second and a third participant, on behalf
of the second participant, who plays the role of a (passive) dictator. When deciding as




moral wiggle room absent DictatorRuler RulerDictator
present DictatorRulerHidden RulerDictatorHidden
We use the parameters of Dana et al. (2007), as in Table 2. In the baseline, parameters
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are with certainty as in the left panel. If the dictator chooses option B, she receives one
additional AC, but deprives the recipient of 4AC. In the treatment, parameters are with 50%
probability replaced by those of the right panel. Hence choosing option B only imposes
harm on the recipient with probability 50%, which creates ”moral wiggle room”.
Table 2: Game
original flipped
dictator recipient dictator recipient
option A 5AC 5AC 5AC 1AC
option B 6AC 1AC 6AC 5AC
Participants are matched in groups of 6. Roles are assigned randomly, with equal prob-
ability. The two participants neutrally labeled “external player” make decisions on behalf
of others. The remaining four participants are passive throughout the entire experiment.
Feedback is withheld until the end of the entire experiment.
We ran the experiment in the lab of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective
Goods in Bonn. 234 students of various majors participated. In the RulerDictatorHidden
treatment we could not fill one matching group of 6 participants. Therefore we have 54
participants in this, and 60 participants in the remaining treatments. 151 participants
(65%) were female. 78 participants were assigned the active role. Participants on average
earned 17.99AC (the equivalent would have been 21.51 $ on the first day of the experiment).
The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were invited
using software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
3. Hypotheses
The utility function of an inequity averse dictator i is given by
Ui(x) = xi − βi max{xi − xj, 0} (1)
where xi denotes the amount that dictator i keeps, xj denotes the amount that is given
to recipient j and βi denotes the intensity of i’s psychological cost from deviating from
the choice that ensures payoff equality. It is assumed that 0 ≤ βi < 1.1
Following Kosse et al., we expect social preferences to be sensitive to context. Specifi-
cally, in our setting we posit βi = ai + 1bi, where ai denotes an innate component, while
1This is a special case of inequity averse preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), where disadvantageous
inequality cannot occur as it is assumed that xj ≤ xi.
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bi is malleable component. The indicator equals 1 when a dictator was first exposed to
the experience of deciding on behalf of others, and 0 otherwise. This gives us
Hypothesis 1. Dictators are more likely to choose the equal split if they have previously
decided on behalf of another person.
We expect this to also hold in the presence of moral wiggle room:
Hypothesis 2. Dictators who have a chance not to learn the effect of their decision on
the recipient are more likely to choose the equal split if they have previously made the
same decision on behalf of another person.
4. Results
Table 3 summarizes results. In the standard dictator game, we find no support for hy-
pothesis 1. If participants have first decided on behalf of the passive dictator, 15 out of
20 make the equitable choice. If, instead, participants immediately decide as dictators,
19 out of 20 make the equitable choice. The experience of having decided on behalf of a
third party does not mitigate selfishness – it exacerbates it (Mann Whitney, N = 40, p =
.0803).2 Deciding for others does not mitigate selfishness in the hidden treatments either.
In fact, in both treatments 4 participants choose the equal split when dictators (Mann
Whitney, N = 38, p = .8685).
Table 3: Results
choice on behalf of another choice on behalf of oneself
fair unfair fair unfair
dictator ruler 20 0 19 1
ruler dictator 16 4 15 5
dictator ruler hidden 18 2 4 16
ruler dictator hidden 15 3 4 14
We thus find no support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, and conclude:
2In the DictatorRuler and the RulerDictator conditions, we had 20 participants each. Using the con-
ventional parameters of α = .05 and β = .2 and running a two-sided test, we had power to identify
an effect of standardized size .93. A distribution of 15 unfair choices in the DictatorRuler condi-
tion, but 6 unfair choices in the RulerDictator condition would for instance have been identified,
as it has effect size .9837 > .93. For calculating power, we use G*Power for a two-group two-sided
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
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Result 1. If participants in a dictator game have first made the same decision on behalf of
a third party, they are not more likely to choose the equal split when their own endowment
is at stake.
5. Discussion
In the non-hidden treatments, we find weakly significant evidence that having decided on
behalf of a passive dictator makes participants even more selfish. A possible explanation
is moral licensing (Blanken et al., 2015), which has also been found in dictator games
(Brañas-Garza et al., 2013): if dictators have been generous in a first game, they give
less in a second dictator game. After allocating money between two other participants,
with no earning for themselves, participants may feel benevolent (particularly so if they
have opted for the fair option) and then feel licensed to behave selfishly in the subsequent
dictator decision. They may perceive their experience as rulers as a virtuous choice.
An alternative explanation originates in the payoff structure. Rulers cannot earn money,
while dictators can. It is therefore conceivable that participants who have first decided
on behalf of a third party deem it to be their turn to earn when they arrive at the second
stage of the game and become dictators.
6. Conclusions
Social preferences have been shown to be malleable and can be affected, among other
things, by previous experiences. Moreover, there are pronounced differences between
decisions made on behalf of oneself and on behalf of others. This invites the hypothesis
that selfishness could be mitigated by the experience of taking an otherwise identical
decision on behalf of a another person.
If the nudge worked, it would be of direct policy relevance. Whenever a person holds
an office, she decides on behalf of others; think of judges, administrators and managers
of private entities. If the experience of deciding for others tamed selfishness, one might
spread this experience more broadly, for instance by rotating decision making power, or
by randomly assigning members of the general public to such offices (analogously to jury
duty).
Yet unfortunately, at least in our dictator game, we do not find the predicted effect.
Alas the nudge does not work.
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Instructions are translated from German. In the following subsection, we present the
instructions for the Ruler - Dictator treatment (without and with hidden information).




In this part of the study, some of you will play a game with another person in the room.
Before this part starts, we will randomly match people into groups of three. The grouping
will be anonymous, meaning that nobody will ever know which people in the room they
played with.
Each of you will be randomly assigned a role in this game. Your role will be player
X, player Y or “external player” (i.e. a player who makes a choice on behalf of another
player). This role will also be kept anonymous. The differences between these roles will
be described below. Thus, exactly one third of you will be player X, one third player Y
and one third external players. Also, each of you will be in a group of three people that
includes exactly each of these types.
The game that your group will play will be like the one pictured below. The external
player will make a choice on behalf of player X, and will not earn money in this part
of the study. The external player will choose one of two options: A or B. Player Y will
not make any choice. Both players X and Y will receive payments based on the choice
of the external player. The numbers in the table are the payments players receive. The
payments in this table were chosen only to demonstrate how the game works. In the
actual game, the payments will be different.
For example, if the external player chooses B, then we should look in the right square
for the earnings. Here, player X receives 3AC and player Y receives 4AC. Notice that player




In this part of the study, some of you will play a game with another person in the room.
Before this part starts, we will randomly match people into groups of three. The grouping
will be anonymous, meaning that no one will ever know which people in the room they
played with. None of your two partners will be the same as your partners in the previous
decision.
Each of you will be randomly assigned a role in this game. Your role will be player Z,
player W or not participating. This role will also be kept anonymous. The differences
between these roles will be described below. Thus, exactly one third of you will be player
Z, one third player W and one third of you will not participate in this part of the study.
Also, each of you will be in a group of three people that includes exactly each of these
types. The person who will not participate in the study will receive a flat fee of 2AC.
The game that the two active players will play will be like the one pictured below.
Player Z will choose one of two options: C or D. Player W will not make any choice.
Both players will receive payments based on the choice of player Z. The numbers in the
table are the payments players receive. The payments in this table were chosen only to
demonstrate how the game works. In the actual game, the payments will be different.
For example, if player Z chooses D, then we should look in the right square for the
earnings. Here, player Z receives 3AC and player W receives 4AC. Notice that player W‘s
payment is in the lower left corner of the square, player W‘s payment is in the upper right
corner.
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Hidden treatments In part 2, in the hidden treatments the following information is
additionally displayed - only - on the computer screen.
The actual game that the active players will play will be one of the two pictured below.
Note that both games are the same except that player W‘s payments are flipped between
the two. Note that in both games, player Z gets his or her highest payment of 6 by choosing
C. In the game on the left, this gives player W his or her highest payment of 5. In the
game on the right, this gives player W his or her lowest payment of 1.
You do not know which of the games you will be playing. However, note that for player
Z, the payments will be identical. The only thing that differs is the payment for player
W.
The actual game you will play was determined by a coin flip before the experiment.
However, we will not reveal publicly which game you are actually playing. Before playing,
player Z can choose to find out which game is being played, if they want to do so, by
clicking a button. This choice will be anonymous, thus player W will not know if Z knows
which game is being played. Player Z is not required to find out and may choose not to
do so. When the experiment ends, we will pay each player privately.
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Part 3
In the following, we are asking you to make a number of allocation decisions. In so doing
you may earn additional taler, in addition to the ones you have already earned. The
exchange rate is 1AC= 100 points.
You can now six times allocate money between yourself and another randomly selected
participant. In the end of the experiment, one of these six choices will be randomly
selected and taler will be paid out as defined by your allocation choice.
Simultaneously, another participant will have the possibility to allocate taler between
herself and you. This will not be the same participant to whom you can allocate taler.
In the end of the experiment, one of these six choices will be randomly selected and taler
will be paid out following this allocation choice.
Hence you will be receiving the taler you have allocated to yourself, plus the taler
another participant has allocated to you.
The selection of participants will again be at random and independent from group
composition in previous parts of the experiment.
If anything is still unclear, please give us a signal by waving your hand. We will then
come to you and answer your questions.
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